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Abstract: In this work, the novel usage of a physically unclonable function composed of a
network of Mach-Zehnder interferometers for authentication tasks is described. The physically
unclonable function hardware is completely reconfigurable, allowing for a large number of
seemingly independent devices to be utilized, thus imitating a large array of single-response
physically unclonable functions. It is proposed that any reconfigurable array of Mach-Zehnder
interferometers can be used as an authentication mechanism, not only for physical objects,
but for information transmitted both classically and quantumly. The proposed use-case for
a fully-optical physically unclonable function, designed with reconfigurable hardware, is to
authenticate messages between a trusted and possibly untrusted party; verifying that the messages
received are generated by the holder of the authentic device.
© 2021 Optical Society of America under the terms of the OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement

1.

Introduction

Authentication is an important part of any communication protocol, as it provides a method
of guaranteeing the trustworthiness of users and other components in a network, such as keys
and messages. Identity authentication is generally the first method considered, as this primitive
provides protection against an eavesdropper, Eve, pretending to be a legitimate user [1]. It is
important to make any protocol resistant to an eavesdropper, such that the transmitted messages
are known to be from authenticated users. In any authentication scheme the receiver verifies
the creator and sender of information, where in two-party identity authentication specifically, a
communicating party tries to prove (i.e. the prover) their identity and the other verifies (i.e. the
verifier) the provided identity before trusting the data.
An identity authentication scheme works where a sender pre-registers confidential information
regarding his or her identity, often in a form a key or per-user string, in a database held by the
receiver, prior to any communication occurring. When communication is initiated, an identity
authentication event happens where the receiver can receive a set of confidential information
from the sender and verify it against the previously-registered information in the database.
Other versions of authentication, specifically message authentication, work where the sender
and receiver have a secure channel that may be in an untrusted environment. Within the untrusted
environment there is the potential for an eavesdropper to intercept and manipulate messages, or
pose as either the sender or receiver, in what is commonly known as a ‘man-in-the-middle’ (MITM)
attack. The message authentication techniques help to overcome the falsification of identity when
sending messages by appending, or applying, hardware-specific user information to the message
between a prover and verifier. The proposed work here represents a model for a quantum-enhanced
message authentication scheme built around an integrated optical-hardware-based physically
unclonable function (PUF).
The integrated photonic hardware used in this work is known as a quantum photonic processor
(QPP) and was developed in collaboration between the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) and
the Quantum Photonics Laboratory at MIT under the direction of D. Englund [2–4]. The form
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of optical PUF utilized differs from previous optical PUFs, such as that of Grubel [5] or Tarik
[6], in that our device is a mesh-network of Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZIs) rather than
a single chaotic resonator. Other optical PUFs, including those based on bulk materials, have
been developed such as multi-mode fibers and other scatting media, along with authentication
methods [7–9]. A detailed study of the theory of classical and quantum PUFs is available in [10].
2.

Previous work

In previous work by A. Smith and H. Jacinto, a quantum photonics processor, implemented
as a photonic integrated circuit (PIC), was employed as a physically unclonable function [11].
The fully-optical PUF is designed as a silicon-on-insulator (SOI) integrated optical chip with
electronic control. The optical interferometric device consists of 88 2x2 MZIs, schematically
shown in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. Integrated design of the Mach-Zehnder interferometers used in the quantum photonic
processor showing the waveguides being acted on by computer-controlled phase modulators.
The phase modulators adjust the internal (θ) and external (ϕ) phases seen at the output ports
of the device with two 50:50 beamsplitters implemented as directional couplers, DC1 and
DC2.

The MZIs are connected in a triangular nearest-neighbor configuration, as shown in Fig. 2.
Each MZI is thermally tuned by integrated resistive heating elements on the upper waveguide,
with the MZI applying an ideal 2 × 2 unitary transformation shown in Eq. (1).
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Each MZI consists of two integrated phase shifters: One phase shifter between the two beam
splitters, and a second phase shifter on one output leg. These four components are the four
2 × 2 unitary matrices multiplied in sequence in Eq. (1).The unitary transformation equation
includes two variables, θ and ϕ, which map to the internal phase setting and output phase offset,
respectively, for each MZI.
In this architecture’s foundational application as a PUF [11], the distinguishablility and
uniqueness of the optical design were demonstrated under classical inputs. The metrics chosen
by [11,12] were the Euclidean distance and ℓ 2 -norm of the N number of outputs, from a single
laser-light input, depicted as N = 8 in Fig. 3. In addition, the inter- and intra-device Hamming
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Fig. 2. Simplified MZI architecture depicting the possible inputs that can be used and
output readout via photodetectors. Advanced pumping schemes can be realized, utilizing
external feedback, or where multiple inputs are being pumped by laser-light simultaneously.
The MZI symbol at top is represented by a ‘cross’ where each MZI is composed similarly to
the one shown in Fig. 1.

distances, HDinter and HDintra , modified as the loose Hamming distance, were used as a measure
of relative distinguishability between groups of PUF settings [11]. The work in [11] defines
the quality of the PUF and gives an estimate of the number of reconfigurable settings based
on the physical architecture of the device; a value of 6.85 × 1035 challenge-response pairs
(CRPs) for the full device. The same work defines a uniqueness constraint to determine the
number of fully-independent CRPs that can be utilized. Different architectures will change the
number of viable CRPs. This work assumes that the large device from [11] is being used for all
authentication described.

Fig. 3. Optical PUF output profile from two example challenges applied to the (simplified)
device in the form of MZI settings, with the right graph showing the resulting profile from the
photodetector’s response in terms of relative intensity. The blue and orange bars represent
possible responses to a predefined set of two challenges.

Alternate forms of optical PUFs often require non-trivial bulk optical components, and
alignment, to observe optical patterns originating from things such as micro-structured tokens
generating speckle patterns [9] and imperfections in multi-mode fibers [12]. Our proposed
solution utilizes a PUF which avoids hard-to-scale elements, can be tightly integrated with
standard CMOS components and processes, and effortlessly operates with devices from the
growing field of integrated quantum optics. Of special note is our PUF’s additional operating
mode; where rapid reconfigurability and repeatability aspects allow for our device to operate as
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multiple PUFs. Many of the operating aspects of our PUF, which this work relies on, may be
seen in greater detail in [11].
2.1.

Security of proposed architecture against numerical modeling attacks

Compared with traditional CMOS-based PUFs and other optical PUFs, the device utilized in
[11] is unique in its resistance to numerical model-based attacks. The resistance comes from
the numerical complexity present in the device to be used in this work, where the state-space
for a CMOS-based PUF is comparatively small. From [11] Section IV.A, it can be seen that for
a device similar to Fig. 2 with 10 MZIs, there exists 1.19 × 105 CRPs. While, for this small
example device, a model-based attack may be possible, a more realistic device for application
with respect to this work would be comparable in size to that shown in [11]; generating at least
6.85 × 1035 CRPs, far beyond a number feasibly tractable in numerical model-based attacks.
3.

Optical PUF authentication

PUFs have been suggested as a means to securely authenticate a networked device or remote
user [13]. Current state-of-the-art means of authentication begins with the usage of a classical
encryption key or token stored within a read-only memory (ROM) [14,15]. A PUF is of particular
interest since they often form the basis of hardware primitives necessary to replace these cloneable
shared encryption keys with a non-reproducible physical object or device.
The general operation of a PUF authentication system can be summarised by the image shown
in Fig. 4, where the device containing the optical PUF is characterized with a set of challenges
and the measured responses are captured by the verifier; these are called challenge-response pairs
(CRPs). When the device is manufactured it is characterized with all, or a subset of, possible
challenges and the responses are recorded. The CRPs are then securely stored and delivered to
the purchaser of the device, often called the enrollment data. The CRPs in this protocol are not
publicly released.

Fig. 4. Generic PUF application detailing the operation of a PUF within a network or
device communicating through an untrusted environment where the final value can be
queried by a third-party to verify that the communication taking place is genuine. Once
verified, communication can continue in an untrusted channel.

Due to aging of the device as discussed in [11,16] the responses to a challenge may change
with time. For initial ageing of the device, allowing the verifier a threshold to compensate for the
error is the easiest solution but, since this is a cumulative physical process, it is extremely hard to
predict how each device will respond over longer periods of time and unfortunately would require
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a rebuild of the CRP tables by the manufacturer. This would be akin to a standard periodic
recalibration procedure.
Once the device is in use away from the manufacturing facility and/or connected via an
untrusted channel, one of the challenges can be applied to verify that the expected response is
generated. If the verification is successful, the authenticity of the device can be assumed.
3.1.

Implementation

To utilize the optical PUF in a practical application, a more subtle approach is necessary.
The challenge applied to the optical PUF is in the form of electrical settings sent through a
control-module, while classical light, or single photons are present at the input ports. When the
challenge applied is in the form of classical light, the MZIs will configure the light to a certain
output profile, depicted by Fig. 3. The output profile is in terms of normalized relative intensity
across the measured photodiodes, where a distinct histogram is formed for each provided set of
challenges to the MZIs.
Similarly, the purely-quantum variant of utilizing the optical PUF will result in a set of MZI
phase modulation settings being sent to the device as a challenge via the same control-module
mentioned previously. The result will be an arbitrary state output from the device where the PUF
has applied an arbitrary unitary transformation, U arb , to the photons entering the device. The
mathematical representation of a PUF authenticator with N input and output modes and q-many
unentangled photons will be:
Uqarb
|ψ challenge ⟩qi = |ψ response ⟩qi ,
i
where |ψ response ⟩qi =

N
∑︂

αqi ,j |j⟩,

(2)

j=0

for a q-many qubit (photon) input state with indexable qubits at position i. The response will be in
a superposition state with some coefficients αqi ,j on output modes |j⟩ due to the natural structure
of the PUF device [11]. Since a single or multi-photon input, of an unknown state will enter the
device, the resulting output density matrix, ρψresponse , will have an additional weight constants ωn
and PUF weight constants ωp , described further in Section 4, where each weight constant affects
the separate logical |0⟩ and |1⟩ components of a qubit. The output response (histogram) from the
PUF will then be projected from a measurement (actually repeated measurements) of:
ρqi ψresponse = |ψ response ⟩qi ⟨ψ response |qi

(3)

= ωn ωp Uq†arb
(a|01⟩⟨01| + b|10⟩⟨10|)Uqarb
.
i
i

(4)

Where qi is each input qubit, the |01⟩ and |10⟩ are Fock states encoded in the i and i + 1
wave-guide input modes. Here we assume a separable qubit input state for clarity, however
more complicated states such as entangled states and non-qubit states such as NOON states
(|20⟩ + |02⟩) can be applied.
3.2.

Classical PUF readout

The operation of a fully optical PUF in a quantum system has not been studied before but,
something similar was approached by B. Škorić, whereby a quantum readout protocol was
developed to interface with a classical PUF [17]. The readout protocol is modified, described
below, with key notational differences to fit this work and to allow for a reconfigurable, optical,
PUF.
The quantum readout of the optical PUF is straightforward, where the challenge space of
the device is a d-dimensional Hilbert space, H , representing any state with q-qubits in N input
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modes; with a projective mapping to the response Hilbert space. Our device, being electronically
reconfigurable, facilitates the mapping of an optical input combined with input phase settings
into a ‘challenge’ Hilbert space with the response from the device being a ‘response’ Hilbert
space. An arbitrary input challenge |ψ challenge ⟩ ∈ H is mapped through the optical PUF, with
statistical response R̂, such that R̂|ψ challenge ⟩ ∈ H . The response will be unique, up to the limit
of uniqueness from [11] where all nominal values of unique CRPs are above 50%, for each
challenge applied. In general, uniqueness should be approximately 50%; this value is based on a
binary PUF delivering results from GF(2n ), where the reconfigurable optical device in question
will show many more possibilities up to CRPmax depending on the initial challenge, thus more
unique and semi-unique CRPs exist. R̂ may not necessarily be unitary, but can be decomposed
into a response coefficient matrix R and response unitary U arb such that R̂ = R U arb . Here we
note that our proposed protocol is a simple protective operation and does not require full state
tomography; often prohibitively slow and difficult to accomplish.
The authentication between two parties, Alice and Bob, works where the verifier (Alice) wants
to check if Bob still possesses the optical PUF. Alice first retrieves the original shared enrollment
data, then picks a random state, ψ, and prepares the state ψ challenge ∈ H and sends to Bob. Bob
then lets the prepared particle interact with the optical PUF, resulting in the final response state
ψ response = R̂ψ challenge that is then sent back to Alice. Since the result of the PUF response is in
the density matrix, Alice then computes ρψresponse according to Eq. (4). Alice is then able to repeat
this process multiple times to be sure that Bob’s PUF is the correct PUF being used.
3.3.

Thresholding of responses and proportional weights

From Section 3.1, a series of weights can be seen affecting the final output response. What the
verifier sees as a response may vary with the weights based on the physical attributes of the
underlying PUF. Ultimately a threshold on response would change the window of proportionality
of the response such that the input selection weight constant for the device ωn and the chosen
PUFs CRP weight ωp work together to make the overall weight of response. Since the device
proposed to be used in this work is computer-controlled and interference-based, a threshold on
response is required to get the verifier’s window of acceptability. The probabilistic processes that
influence the device’s response necessitate an acceptability window on the response; used to
make a determination on the response and whether to accept or reject the data.
The form of the response from the readout will be a state composed of challenge-specific
probabilities that can be verified against the original PUF being used for the message authentication.
The constant on a single-response state can be represented by the general form cR̂U arb ± ϵ where
c is a constant probability scalar and ϵ is the limiting threshold placed by the verifier when
matching against the originally published CRPs.
3.4.

General security measure of optical PUF authentication

The security of the protocol described is based on the no-cloning theorem, or in this work, the
unclonability of the unknown quantum state by an eavesdropper [18,19]. For each round of
the optical PUF quantum authentication protocol described: A standard challenge-estimation
attack, where an adversary who attempts to determine the challenge applied using measurement
2
techniques, will only have a maximum probability of (1+d)
to cause a ‘true’ response from the
PUF. The overall probability of a false positive decreases exponentially with the number of
verification challenges that Alice sends to Bob. Since the protocol can be generalized to be q
qubits (photons), the state-space becomes |ψ challenge ⟩ ⊗q , where the attacker’s per-qubit success
q+1
probability is upper-bounded by q+d
[20].
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Authentication of classical and quantum information with fully-optical PUF

Traditionally, PUFs are only used for device authentication and not for message authentication. Our
device is fully optical and can accept quantum states ‘at-once’ unlike the original readout protocol
[17]. The modified protocol described also has the additional benefit of being reconfigurable, or
the ability to act as many PUFs within a single device due to the tunability of the MZI’s relative
phases. The major difference is in the density matrix and projected measurements showing the
additional ωp parameter. The value for ωp changes with each distinct challenge possible within
the device such that the solution space increases not only by |ψ challenge ⟩ ⊗q but, by an additional
factor of:
CRP
∑︂max
||ωp, i ||,
(5)
i=0

where the value for CRPmax can be determined by a maximal upper bound by following the
Catalan numbers shown in previous work [11].
Following the modified quantum readout, a simple extension can be made where authentication
of classical data, and quantum messages can be completed. In the classical case, Bob receives the
optical PUF used in this work that acts as set of several distinct devices labeled {1, . . . , CRPmax }.
Bob wants to send an authenticated classical random variable X : Ω → R or message vector
X = (x1 , . . . , xn )T ∈ R to Alice. Bob’s message vector of length n is decomposed into
ki = {1, . . . , n} ↦→ X, where k = (pj )Nj=1 |pj ∈ {1,...,CRPmax } , for some PUF pj with selected CRP,
j, and is subsequently sent to Alice. Effectively each element of a message vector, or random
variable, maps to a specific PUF within the reconfigurable PUF, with a probability based on the
message.
Alice and Bob perform the following:
1. Bob sends ki to Alice over a public and non-authenticated channel.
2. For j ∈ {1, . . . , CRPmax } Alice and Bob both perform the modified quantum readout
protocol using the PUF’s CRP number pj .
During each of the CRP tests in pj , Alice slowly gains confidence that Bob’s PUF is returning
the responses to her issued challenges. Since there is a response to the challenges it can be
assumed that the holder of Bob’s PUF agrees with the individual variable ki sent over the
non-authenticated channel.
The quantum message authentication variant of the modified quantum readout protocol
operates significantly differently with respect to the initial design. Consider a PUF design where
CRPmax = 3. Alice sends a random challenge state |ψ challenge ⟩ to Bob. Bob then routes the
challenge to CRP1 with probability amplitude α, CRP2 with probability amplitude β, and CRP3
with probability amplitude γ. The probability amplitudes are sent to satisfy |α| 2 + | β| 2 + |γ| 2 = 1
since the total probabilities cannot sum to be greater than one. Similarly, for
∑︁ more complex
messages, a probability vector P = (pi , . . . , n), the probabilities must adhere to nk=1 p2k = 1. This
also assumes that ||X||n = ||P||n . Bob’s response state sent back would then be:
|ψ response ⟩ = αR̂0 |ψ challenge ⟩ + βR̂1 |ψ challenge ⟩ + γ R̂2 |ψ challenge ⟩,
⏞⏟⏟⏞
⏞⏟⏟⏞
⏞⏟⏟⏞
αR0 U0arb

βR1 U1arb

(6)

γR2 U2arb

which is subsequently sent to Alice. Alice is then able to verify, even though she doesn’t know
the probability amplitudes (α, β, γ), since she does know the components of R̂i from the initial
registration of the optical PUF. This means that when Alice verifies Bob’s response, that she will
need to rely on the initial PUF weight constant, ωp , to have a ‘best guess’ of what the probability
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assignment for the PUF’s CRPs would be when assigned by Bob. Alice then knows that:
|ωpCRP0 | 2 + |ωpCRP1 | 2 + |ωpCRP2 | 2 ∝ |α| 2 + | β| 2 + |γ| 2 ,

(7)

where she will then be able to determine that the responses and probabilities match those that
were originally registered from the PUF – assumed to be – held by Bob. Alice also knows from
receiving the modified state that the sender has to be holding Bob’s PUF; thus achieving an
optical, reconfigurable, PUF-based authentication of a quantum state.
4.1.

Secrecy of modified readout for reconfigurable PUF

From a security standpoint of the quantum message authentication using an all-optical PUF with
reconfigurable CRPs, the data could still be considered confidential. Assuming a challengeestimation attack on a q-qubit system where q<d, an initial state ψ challenge would be chosen
uniformly at random. An attacker could know ψ response but would not posses the PUF. Additionally
assuming the attacker does not have access to a quantum machine, or any device that can compute
arbitrary unitary transformations losslessly, only a generic measurement could be completed
with a biased estimator. The adversary would then only be able to compute an estimation of a
response Ê |ψresponse ⟩ = R̂Ê |ψchallenge ⟩ .
If an adversary challenged Bob’s PUF, the response would not necessarily reveal the probability
amplitudes (α, β, γ) of the proper CRP because, to an adversary, this information could plausibly
be from a different reconfigurable PUF or could relate to a different reconfiguration setting. In
addition, an adversary that could determine the probability amplitudes sent for different CRPs
would not know the original registered parameter, ωp , that contains the true suggested probability
amplitudes for each of the CRPs within the reconfigurable PUF.
Thus, the modified quantum readout scheme for a reconfigurable all optical PUF verifies the
authenticity of the PUF and can be used to authenticate both classical messages and quantum
states.
5.

Conclusion

In this work we described the usage of a reconfigurable all-optical PUF as a hardware authentication
mechanism. The usage of the optical PUF as an authentication mechanism is carried out by a
modified quantum readout protocol. The readout protocol makes the PUF able to authenticate
classical and quantum information through the usage of classical light or single-photon-level
manipulations. Additionally, the usage of the hardware optical PUF enables one to authenticate
that the receiver of information is not adversarial in nature. This work represents the first
application of an all-optical reconfigurable PUF for tasks other than object and direct-access user
authentication.
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